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Reflections on Appointive Local Government
Bodies and a Right to an Election
Sheldon H. Nahmod*
While few would dispute the importance in a representative democracy of the right to vote for government officials, there appears to be
relatively little discussion of what might be termed an individual's constitutional right to an election.' Granted, the reapportionment cases2
and other voting rights cases8 direct attention to vote dilution and
voters' qualifications, but they involve situations where elections have
already been provided. Suppose, however, that elected officials of a
properly apportioned municipality are permitted by statute to appoint
members of a school board which will be exercising important governmental powers, such as the power to levy and collect taxes, issue bonds,
and acquire property by condemnation.4 Might an argument be made
that those school board members must constitutionally be elected by
their constituents? What could be the constitutional source and judicial
standards of such a right to an election? And, what might be the implications of this right?
This article will explore these questions, beginning with the reap* A. B., University of Chicago; LL.B., LL.M., Harvard Law School; Teaching Fellow,
Harvard Law School 1969-71; Associate Professor of Law, Duquesne Law School.
1. See, e.g., Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 109-10 (1967): "We need not decide at
the present time whether a state may constitute a local legislative body through the appointive rather than the elective process." See also F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, MATERIAIS
ON GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS 180, 913 (1970) [hereinafter cited as MICHELMAN & SANDALOW].

2. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
3. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
4. The Supreme Court has characterized powers of this sort as significant for reapportionment purposes because they are general and have considerable impact throughout the
geographical area in which they are exercised. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50,
53-54 (1970).
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portionment cases which prompted them. The following discussion is
primarily intended to stimulate further thinking in this area.
THE REAPPORTIONMENT CASES

Although the reapportionment cases are not in themselves authority
for a constitutional right to an election, an analysis of several of the
more recent cases is helpful in speculating about such a right. One
such case, Avery v. Midland County,5 the first Supreme Court decision
applying "one man, one vote" to local government, involved the Midland County (Texas) Commissioners Court, four of whose five members were elected from districts of widely varying populations. This
body, inter alia, set a county-wide tax rate, equalized assessments, issued bonds, and prepared and adopted a budget for allocating the
county's funds. Utilizing a "power-impact" test, the Court found that
the commissioners court had the power "to make a large number of
decisions having a broad range of impacts on all the citizens of the
county,"6 and characterized these as "general governmental powers"
over the entire county. On this basis, the Court held unconstitutional
the statutory election scheme.
This decision was not unexpected. Referring to predictions that a
decision like Avery was likely, and even desirable, Justice Clark
was heartened by "the possibility of educated forecasts of Supreme
Court trends even without computerization." '7 In contrast, the 1970
decision in Hadley v. Junior College District8 was less predictable.
Hadley involved the validity of Missouri legislation authorizing the
formation of junior college districts geographically composed of smaller
school districts. Voters in each school district elected the trustees of the
junior college school district according to a formula that was not based
proportionately on population. In holding the scheme invalid, the
Court applied "one man, one vote" to the election of the trustees.
Hence, Hadley was a significant extension of Avery in several respects.
First, Hadley involved a governmental unit in which the voters of each
school district had voluntarily decided by referendum to participate
while the scheme in Avery both set up a county commissioners court
5. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
6. Id. at 483.
7. Symposium-One Man-One Vote and Local Government, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 689
(1968).

8.
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and determined the number of court members to be elected by the
voters of each district. In addition, Hadley involved a special purpose
unit. The elected officials exercised their powers, which included tax
levy and collection, bond issuance, school district annexation and
eminent domain, for a specific and limited educational purpose. In
Avery, however, the commissioners court could exercise powers for
purposes affecting almost every county resident in many areas of his
life; it decided "whether industry should be solicited, roads improved,
recreational facilities built and land set aside for school." 9
Had the Court in Hadley so chosen, it could have recognized a distinction, for reapportionment purposes, between elections of officials
who may exercise their powers for broad governmental purposes and
elections of those whose powers may be exercised only for a specific
purpose, such as education. Justice Harlan, dissenting, suggested that
the justification for such a distinction could have been couched in
terms of the arguably greater degree of flexibility necessary for the effective functioning of special purpose units.'0 Yet, this distinction would
not be persuasive under a power-impact test, for it may well be that the
powers and impact of a special purpose unit on its constituents are as
important as those of a general purpose unit. For example, the Court
pointed out in Brown v. Board of Education" that providing education is crucial in a society which seems to offer its best primarily to
those with a quality education. This view of the importance of education is also implicit in Hadley where the Court emphasized that "[e]ducation has traditionally been a vital government function .... ,, 2
For the purpose of articulating a rationalefor a right to an election,
the Hadley Court's decision not to take into account the purpose of a
particular governmental unit in applying "one man, one vote" seems
significant. After pointing out the difficulty in distinguishing between
various elections,"1 the Court indicated that the best, and perhaps the
only, way of determining the importance of choosing a particular governmental official" is the "decision of the State to select that official by
popular vote.' 4 This could signal that the Hadley Court was moving
away from applying a power-impact test which would assess a local unit's
9. 390 U.S. at 483.
10. 397 U.S. at 59.
11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12. 397 U.S. at 56.
13. Id. at 55.
14. Id.
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powers and their impact upon the unit's constituents before applying
"one man, one vote." Justice Harlan apparently saw such a movement
because he expressed concern that Hadley "forebodes, if indeed the
case does not decide, that the rule is to be applied to every elective
public body, no matter what its nature."' 15 Whether this is a correct
reading of Hadley is uncertain, especially in view of the Hadley Court's
apparent reliance on the power-impact test first set out in Avery.' 6
What is clear from Hadley is considerable, if not conclusive, reliance
upon the state's decision to hold popular elections.
However, should the concern for participation in an election process
depend upon the prior existence of an election? For example, appointing the school board members in the hypothetical given at the outset
could deny to affected citizens a meaningful voice in the selection process. This result is not justified by suggesting that the complaining
citizen's recourse should be to the properly apportioned municipality or
legislature where he might exert political pressure on an equal footing
with others. For this suggestion to citizens could, arguably, also justify
the election from malapportioned districts of local officials to a special
purpose unit where the municipality and legislature are properly apportioned. The holdings in Avery and Hadley indicate, however, that
it does not. Consequently, something more seems at stake in the Avery
and Hadley cases than recourse to a higher, politically accountable
general purpose governmental unit.
What is at stake was aptly characterized by the Court in Avery when
it stated:, "[I]nstitutions of local government have always been a major
aspect of our system, and their responsible and responsive operation is
today of increasing importance to the quality of life of more and more
of our citizens."' 7 In view of a citizen's interest in "responsible and
responsive" local units,'8 perhaps the existence of elections ought not
15. Id. at 60.
16. It is also worth noting that the majority opinion in Hadley stated:
It is of course possible that there might be some case in which a state, elects certain
functionaries whose duties are so far removed from normal governmental activities
and so disproportionately affect different groups that a popular election in compliance
with ["one man, one vote'] might not be required .
Id. at 56.
17. 390 U.S. at 481.
18. This is not to suggest, of course, that direct elections guarantee responsible and
responsive government. The point is that an election provides at least the opportunity to
have some say in selecting the persons whose decisions will affect citizens. This will often
assure some citizen input into the kinds of decisions made. The extent of their. "say" and
"input" beyond individual votes is uncertain, however, in view of Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
U.S. 124 (1971). There the Court held that ghetto residents who claimed that -Indiana's
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to depend exclusively on a decision of the legislature or the municipality to have them. For if the interest in participatory democracy is so strong
as to mandate under the Constitution the equal opportunity to participate, then this same interest could perhaps serve as the basis for a requirement that an election be held in certain circumstances, thereby
providing the opportunity itself to participate. Conceivably, even
officials of some special purpose units ought to be directly accountable
to their constituents-those upon whom the impact of the unit's decisions will fall-regardless of whether it is the state or the municipality
which has not provided for an election.
This argument for serious consideration of a right to an election appears at first blush to have been rejected by the Supreme Court in
Sailors v. Board of Education.9 There, local school boards that were
popularly elected in turn appointed all five members of the county
school board. This scheme was upheld against a challenge to the county
board based on its non-compliance with "one man, one vote." The
Court seemed to indicate that "one man, one vote" simply did not apply where the state had not provided for an election.
Sailors, however, is distinguishable from the hypothetical school
board situation which involves the exercise of powers of a legislative
character. In Sailors, the Court concluded that the local county board
officials exercised powers of a non-legislative character. Surprisingly,
these supposedly non-legislative powers included the preparation of an
annual budget, the levy of taxes, and the power to transfer areas from
one school district to another. The Sailors characterization of such
powers as non-legislative now appears questionable in view of the
county commissioners court's similar powers in Avery. Still, a court
could distinguish the hypothetical school board from the county school
board in Sailors because the latter case, correctly or not, placed great
reliance upon the asserted non-legislative character of the county board.
Furthermore, the Court in Sailors emphasized that it was not deciding
"whether a State may constitute a local legislative [as distinguished
from a non-legislative] body through the appointive rather than the
elective process. ' 20 It thereby avoided the issue of a right to an election
which the hypothetical and this discussion are intended to raise.
multimember districts prevented their effective representation in the legislature had not
met their substantial burden of showing inadequate representation of their interests.
19. 387 U.S. 105 (1967); cf. Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967).
20. Id. at 109-10.
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THE RIGHT AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS

If one concludes from the foregoing discussion that there are reasons
for the existence of a right to an election, its constitutional basis must
then be identified. The due process clause is one possibility. It has
been intimated, for example, that a legislature should not be permitted
to vest governmental authority over matters concededly local in persons not locally elected, because due process might require the direct
participation of affected citizens voting in the selection of that governing body. 21 However, unlike the extent of the federal judiciary's experience with the equal protection clause in a voting context, there
has been little, if any, such experience with the due process clause.
Consequently, there would be relatively few judicial standards to use
22
in determining whether a right to an election has been violated.
If the right were to be based on the equal protection clause, the
problem of judicial standards and experience, as will be seen, is somewhat diminished. Unlike the due process clause, the equal protection
clause would require some kind of state classification; generally speaking, equal protection questions only arise where the state has first classified persons for the purpose of receiving benefits or incurring
detriments. In the Avery and Hadley cases, for example, it was the
state's discriminatory treatment of voters who resided in different areas
that was held to violate equal protection. The hypothetical school board
scheme would appear to involve no discrimination between voters since
there is no provision for an election.
The right to an election, however, could conceivably be grounded on
a theory, akin to substantive due process, of "minimum equal protection," an approach which has been discussed in the context of a "right
to an education." 23 This approach would require the state to eradicate
differences, based on wealth differential, in access to certain rights and
benefits, such as public education, and is analytically derived from Su21. MICHELMAN & SANDALOW, supra note 1, at 180. See also Herget, The Impact oj the
Fourteenth Amendment on the Structure oj Metropolitan and Regional Governments, 23

HASTINGS L.J. 763, 781 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Herget].
22. Nevertheless, there are situations discussed later, see notes 36-45 infra, where the
due process clause might be the best vehicle for a right to an election. See note 36 infra.
The equal protection clause is emphasized here because the power-impact test was articulated in connection with it.
The guaranty clause of the Federal Constitution has been determined by the Supreme
Court to be nonjusticiable. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 223-26 (1962). Hence, its possible
applicability to this discussion is not considered. But see R. DiXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 136 (1968).
23. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Forward: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969).
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preme Court decisions involving criminal process and voting rights.
But there is considerable doubt whether a right to an education, standing alone and apart from racial discrimination, involves an interest
significant enough to require the state to make some educational offering under a minimum equal protection theory. Even recent school financing cases such as Serrano v. Priest,2 4 while they characterize
education as a fundamental interest, are not authority for a minimum
equal protection approach because they involved discrimination by the
state.
However, after the reapportionment cases, no such doubt exists as
to the propriety of characterizing voting rights generally as a fundamental interest. The right to an election, apparently on firmer "fundamental interest" ground than the right to an education, might be a
more appropriate vehicle for a minimum equal protection approach.
In addition, the difficulty in elaborating what constitutes this "minimum" is greater for the right to an education that it is for the right
to an election. "Education," much less "minimum" education, has not
been consistently or coherently defined even by educators, while an
"election," though it can vary in its details, is in essence a reasonably
well articulated democratic process. Assuming therefore that a court
is sympathetic to a minimum equal protection approach, there could
conceivably be less judicial reluctance in ordering an "election" than
an "education." However, the Supreme Court's implicit rejection of a
minimum equal protection approach in Dandridge v. Williams,25 a
welfare case, should prevent a court from adopting it even in a voting
context.
A different approach would involve more traditional equal protection considerations. If in our hypothetical scheme other municipalities
within the state were permitted to elect their school board officials it
could be argued, based on Griffin v. County School Board,26 that the
voters within the hypothetical school district are denied equal protection. Read very broadly, Griffin might hold that territorial discrimination by the state must meet the test of the equal protection clause.27 At
least where voting rights are endangered, a denial of equal protection
might exist where a legislature did not require elections for a particular
24. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
25. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
26. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
27. Cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). See generally Horowitz & Neitring,
Equal Protection Aspects in Public Education and Public Assistance Programs from Place
to Place Within a State, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 787, 796 (1968).
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school board while requiring them for all other school boards. It might
also exist where a municipality itself, under a local option statute, in
fact exercised local option and decided not to elect its school board. In
Reynolds v. Sims, 2 8 the Court held invalid a legislature reapportionment

scheme which had been approved by the voters in the state. This would
indicate that if the right to an election were accorded constitutional status similar to the constitutional right in the reapportionment cases, it
could not be abridged by a vote of the residents in a municipality.
Such a conclusion would also be consistent with the result in Hadley
where the Court held invalid a statutory apportionment scheme for the
election of junior college trustees even though each of the member
school districts had decided by voter referendum to participate voluntarily.
Using an equal protection approach in this context, a court could
justify its intervention on the ground that voting rights are a "fundamental interest" which is to be protected by active judicial review. 29
In reapportionment cases, the citizen's interest has been characterized
as the equality in distribution of political power stemming from the
right to vote for a legislative representative. 0 As noted earlier, these decisions have repeatedly emphasized that this interest is clearly "fundamental," requiring that any state impairment of this interest be justified
by a compelling state interest. In addition to the reapportionment cases,
active judicial review is apparent from decisions which have held unconstitutional, as a violation of equal protection, certain property qualifications for voting in both general and school board elections.3 1
Territorial discrimination of the sort involved in the hypothetical situation, which implicates voting rights, could similarly require for its
justification that the state show a compelling state interest and not
merely a rational basis.
THE RIGHT AND JUDICIAL STANDARDS

Closely related to the discussion of a constitutional basis is the question of the judicial standards that could be used in determining the
28.

377 U.S. 533 (1964).

29.

See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1124-33

(1969).
30. Averbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote, One
Value, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 22; Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L.
REv. 1065, 1129 (1969).

31.
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existence of a denial of the right to an election. Here, too, the right
to an election, as contrasted with the right to an education, benefits
from the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements on the "one man,
one vote" rule and local government. The power-impact test used in
Avery and Hadley could similarly be used to determine when officials
of local general and special purpose units must be elected. As applied
to the right to an election, this test would weigh the exercise of the
officials' powers and their actual and potential impact in determining
whether to make those officials directly accountable to their constituents.
In this connection, several considerations must be briefly noted.
First, the power-impact test could be used for the right to an election
even if the Court, with respect to apportionment, is moving towards
exclusive reliance on the state's decision to have an election. Second,
this test, because it has been used by the Court in only a few cases,
provides uncertain guidance as to the factors important in asserting a right to an election. Uncertainty also results from the Court's
inconsistent characterizations of similar powers in Sailors and Avery.
It is true that Hadley answered in the affirmative the question whether,
under a power-impact test, "one man, one vote" could be applied to
a special purpose unit. Nevertheless, at this stage the relative importance of various powers, such as ad valorem taxation and annexation,
is unclear in apportionment cases and also, therefore, for purposes of
asserting a right to an election. Courts would have to make these determinations on a case by case basis.
Judicial recognition of a right to an election would, of course, further involve courts in the "political thicket," which Justice Frankfurter
warned against. Still, a court following this approach would not tell
a legislature or municipality what powers it must assign to local officials. This approach would only require an election where the powers
assigned, under a power-impact test, warrant making local officials directly accountable to their constituents. Thus, a court that found a
violation of the right to an election in the hypothetical scheme could
give the legislature or municipality the opportunity to formulate the
details for the election, which might include the number of officials
to be elected, their qualifications, the timing of the first election, and
the frequency of subsequent elections. Such a judicial procedure would
be consistent with that used in the school desegregation decisions.
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DOCTRINE

The judicial procedure to be used in protecting the right to an election raises the question of the differences in effect between the successful assertion of this right and the non-delegation doctrine. The
non-delegation doctrine, while effectively dead in the federal system,
is apparently very much alive in the states. 32 This doctrine nominally
prohibits a state from delegating so-called legislative power to non-representative persons or bodies who may act arbitrarily. The most common judicial approach to delegation involves an inquiry into the
existence of legislative "standards" which limit the discretion exercised
by the subordinate government. 33 Given standards, the assumption is
that the delegated power is so circumscribed that when exercised, it is in
effect the legislature which is acting. But where the court does not discover such standards, its response has been to declare the attempted
delegation void. Consequently, until the standards are supplied by the
legislature, the delegate has no authority to act in the particular standardless context.
In response to such a judicial decision, a legislature might provide
standards under which the delegate body would act. Alternatively, it
could provide that the officials constituting the delegate body are to
be elected. Either response would probably save the delegate body from
another successful non-delegation attack.34 It is in this connection, however, that the non-delegation doctrine is distinguishable in its effect
from a right to an election. If a legislature only provides standards, the
delegation of legislative power would be upheld for non-delegation
doctrine purposes, but, given a right to an election, might still be invalid in the absence of an election. Consequently, the right to an election may in some circumstances render invalid an otherwise valid
delegation.
THE RIGHT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

It is reasonable to assume that the officials of most general purpose
local governmental units such as counties and municipalities are already selected by popular election. If the right to an election were
limited to such general purpose units, its practical significance thereSee generally I K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 2.01-.16 (1958).
33. Id.
34. See Herget supra note 21, at 772-73.
32.
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fore would in all likelihood be minimal. The Court's decision in Hadley, however, undercuts such a limitation, for it suggests a substantial
interest in the accountability of even special purpose unit officials to
voters who will be affected by the exercise of their powers. In view of
the presumably numerous and diverse situations where officials of special purpose units are not elected, 35 the effect on these situations of
recognizing a right to an election which uses a power-impact test could
be considerable.
For example,3 6 the right to an election could be applied to metropolitan special purpose units that are the products of collaboration
among different governmental units. Hadley applied "one man, one
vote" to a consolidated junior college district which voters, notwithstanding malapportionment, had decided by referendum to form. Similarly, governmental units desiring to cooperate in the creation of a
metropolitan special purpose unit could be required to provide an
election if the special purpose unit were given powers with wide-ranging impact on its constituents. Under this view, an election could have
been mandated in Hadley, for example, had there been no election
provided for the trustees.
More generally, the right to an election might be applicable to metropolitan councils of government.3 7 In a discussion of these COG's,3 8
it was suggested that "a metropolitan planning body, in order to be
able to deal with problems of efficiency, equity, and responsibility, must
exist more or less independently of existing units," 39 and that "[d]irect
elections of metro organization members would, of course, be the most
powerful means of altering this perception [of a consensus courtesy
practice]. '40 Yet concern was expressed that people would probably not
take such elections seriously. It is true that the writers' solution-that
35. See generally Herget, supra note 21, at 767, 786-88 (Port of New York Authority,
Chicago Transit Authority, Association of Bay Area Governments, etc.).
36. The applicability of a right to an election to the following examples might be better
based on the due process clause than on the equal protection clause because, unlike the
hypothetical school board, there might be no state classification involved. See notes 21-31
supra. In that event, perhaps the power-impact test used in the reapportionment cases
might be incorporated for use through the due process clause.
37. See generally Comus, The Council of Governments Approach to Governmental Fragmentation, 22 VAND. L. REv. 811 (1969).

38. MICHELMAN & SANDALOW, supra note 1, at 815-23. Another commentator refers to
regional governments of this sort as posing "one of the most perplexing problems to be
faced under one-man, one-vote." He suggests that the real question is whether the delegates represent the people in their local units or the local unit as a political organization.
Herget, supra note 21, at 789.
39. MICHELMAN & SANDALOW, supra note 1, at 820.
40. Id. at 821.
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state legislators elected from districts within the metropolitan area
would be the "legislative core of the council, and act as its governing
body" 41-might comply with the requirement of an election for purposes of this discussion. Nevertheless, the solution rests on two assumptions which might appear questionable. The first is that state legislators
could competently carry out both their state and metro functions at
one and the same time. And second, that voters would not take a direct
election seriously. As the Supreme Court said in Hadley, "what might
be a vital election to one voter might well be a routine one to another. ''42 For these reasons, the better approach might be direct elections.
An election requirement in these circumstances might answer the
objections of another commentator 43 who argues against the application of "one man, one vote" to metropolitan government. He suggests
that municipalities, faced with reapportionment if they form a metropolitan government, will respond by "the old devices of appointed,
administratively-oriented, special districts and authorities."4 4 These, he
contends, are not at all effective for regional governance. However, because municipal officials could not, merely by appointing, evade an
election requirement imposed on such special purpose units under a
power-impact test, this might provide a stimulus toward the politically
45
accountable metropolitan government that the commentator favors.
It might be argued that public control through voting of most special purpose units is to be avoided. First, public control would make it
less likely that a unit's projects will be desirable and efficient for financial purposes. Second, the most capable people would not want to
run for elections. These arguments, however, are misconceived in connection with the right to an election. Accountability through elections
does not in itself make a unit's projects inefficient and unattractive
from an investor's viewpoint. Rather, accountability helps to guard
41. Id.
42. 397 U.S. at 55. Compare, however, Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971), in which
the Court upheld an apportionment scheme for a county legislature which departed by
over ten percent from mathematical equality. The Court stressed that the scheme, whereby
county supervisors held their offices by virtue of their election or town supervisors, reflected over a century of county and town coordination.
43. Jones, Metropolitan Detente: Is It Politically and Constitutionally Possible, 36 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 741 (1968).
44. Id. at 743.
45. The right to an election could conceivably apply to federally funded municipal
housing authorities which, while without the power to tax, may have the power to condemn and to issue bonds. See, e.g., City of Paterson v. Housing Authority, 96 N.J. Super.
394, 233 A.2d 98 (Super. Ct. 1967).
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against projects which, while efficient and financially attractive, are not
responsive to the needs of the public. It is true that the quality of special purpose unit officials, whether appointed or elected, often depends
upon the character and power of the predominant political parties.
Still, an election requirement might open up the possibility of higher
quality persons running as independents. It could also improve the
quality of those chosen by the established political parties to run for
election.

46

CONCLUSION

This tentative inquiry into the right to an election was prompted
in part by the reapportionment cases which reflect the special attention given to the citizen's voice in selecting those governmental officials
whose decisions will affect him. This attention led to consideration of
the possible constitutional basis and judicial standards of such a right,
as well as some discussion of its implications. Admittedly, the costs of
further judicial intervention in this highly sensitive political area
might be excessive and even prohibitive. 47 Furthermore, it is difficult to
assess satisfactorily the practical significance of such a right. One might
guess that the existence of a right to an election would, because of
political considerations, often discourage state and local governments
from creating special purpose units with adequate powers to meet
special needs. If this meant that these needs would go unattended, then
the effect of a right to an election would be undesirable. On the other
hand, it is also possible that special needs would generate enough public
pressure to force the state or municipality to take some kind of action,
despite political considerations. This could result either in new metropolitan or regional governments or special purpose units which would
then be politically accountable to the citizens affected by their decisions.
46. This might be overly optimistic. Also, it must be admitted that voters may become
confused by the multiplicity of elections and hence not vote knowledgeably.
47. Such costs might include judicial imposition of a particular political theory upon
local governments, undercutting flexibility and attempts to experiment, a reluctance on
the part of local governments to comply with a decision to have an election and consequent
evasions, and finally the need to proceed on a case by case basis with the resultant uncertainty.
Similar arguments have been made against the applicability of "one-man, one-vote" to
local government generally, but the Court in Avery apparently discounted such fears. On
the other hand, in both Avery and Hadley the Court emphasized what is apparently a need
for flexibility in applying "one-man, one-vote" to local government. This emphasis is reflected in Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971), where the Court upheld a county's apportionment scheme, given its particular history and effect, despite a population variance in
excess of ten percent.
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While the latter is by no means inevitable, it is the preferable result. If
an individual's constitutional right to an election were successfully asserted, 48 it could perhaps serve no better purpose.
48. But see Wallis v. Blue, 263 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Ga. 1967), where an argument was
unsuccessfully made against a state constitutional provision for grand jury selection of
county school board officials who had the power to levy a county-wide property tax. The
court stated: "There is no federal requirement intended to compel a state to elect any of
its officers or agents through popular vote of the people." Id. at 969. See also Latham v.
Board of Educ., 31 Ill. 2d 178, 201 N.E.2d 111 (1964), holding, inter alia, that Chicago
residents had no inherent right to elect members of the Chicago Board of Education.
However, the appointed Chicago Board of Education does not possess the power to levy
and collect taxes. Furthermore, the decision on this point appears to be based on the
state constitution.
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